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Recent studies argue that the spread-adjusted Taylor rule (STR), which includes a 
response to the credit spread, replicates monetary policy in the United State. We 
show (1) STR is a theoretically optimal monetary policy under heterogeneous loan 
interest rate contracts in both discretionay and commitment monetary policies, (2) 
however, the optimal response to the credit spread is ambiguous given the financial 
market structure in theoretically derived STR, and (3) there, a commitment policy 
is effective in narrowing the credit spread when the central bank hits the zero lower 
bound constraint of the policy rate. 
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 1 Introduction
Taylor (2008) and Cœrdia and Woodford (2008) have recently discussed whether
central banks should respond to the credit spread of interest rates. Taylor (2008)
argues that in the U.S. the Federal Reserve Board (FRB) has reacted negatively to the
credit spread in the money market during the last few years to stimulate the economy.
Taylor (2008) points out that spread-adjusted Taylor rule (STR) that additionally
includes the credit spread term in the standard Taylor Rule (TR) can well explain
the easing of monetary policy by the FRB. Similarly, Cœrdia and Woodford (2008)
theoretically investigate whether a central bank should react to the credit spread
between savers and borrowers. They show that an STR including a negative response
term to the credit spread can approximate the optimal monetary policy.
In this paper, we ￿rst construct an otherwise New Keynesian model with het-
erogeneous loan rate contracts following Sudo and Teranishi (2008). We then derive
a second-order approximated loss function and the optimal monetary policy rule in
this model. Our conclusion is that the STR is a theoretically optimal monetary
policy rule though the central bank￿ s optimal response to the credit spread can be
positive or negative depending on the ￿nancial structure. In brief, we show that a
commitment monetary policy is very e⁄ective in reducing the credit spread when the
central bank hits the zero lower bound on the policy rate.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our model with heteroge-
neous loan contracts and derives a second-order approximated loss function. Section
3 analyzes the optimal monetary policy rule. Section 4 discusses the monetary policy
for the credit spread in a liquidity trap. Section 5 concludes.
2 Model
We basically extend the model in Sudo and Teranishi (2008) where there are hetero-
geneous private banks that provide di⁄erentiated loan rate contracts to ￿rms. Our
departure from Sudo and Teranishi (2008) is that we assume ￿ exible loan rate con-
1tracts where the loan rate perfectly adjusts in every period and assume a monetary
transaction cost for the consumer. Unlike Cœrdia and Woodford (2008), we consider
that market imperfections induce the credit spread through the cost channel as in
Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999) and Ravenna and Walsh (2006).
The model is given by the following four equations:1
xt = Etxt+1 ￿ ￿(b it ￿ Et￿t+1); (1)
￿t = ￿xt + ￿1 b RR;t + ￿2 b RS;t + ￿Et￿t+1; (2)
b RR;t = ￿Rb it + uR;t; (3)
b RS;t = ￿Sb it + uS;t; (4)
where xt is the output gap, ￿t+1 is in￿ ation, b RR;t is the loan interest rate for an R
type loan, b RS;t is the loan interest rate for an S type loan, andb it is the policy interest
rate. We de￿ne each variable as the log deviation from its steady state where the
price is ￿ exible and the loan rates are constant (the log-linearized version of variable
ht is expressed by b ht = ln(ht=h), where h is the steady state value of ht). ￿, ￿, ￿1,
￿2, ￿, ￿L, and ￿S are positive parameters. uR;t and uS;t are exogenous shocks. Et
denotes the expectation at time t.
The ￿rst equation is the IS curve expressing the relation between the output
gap and the real interest rate. The second equation is the augmented Phillips curve
expressing the relation between in￿ ation and the output gap, which additionally
includes loan interest rates since ￿rm needs the external ￿nance. The last two equa-
tions are the loan rate curves under ￿ exible loan rate contracts. We assume that
half of the ￿rms￿business units are ￿nanced by loan type R and the other half are
￿nanced by loan type S. The distinction between loan type R and S is due to di⁄er-
ent property between two types of loans, which induces di⁄erent shock and di⁄erent
ratio of external ￿nance in these loans.
A new property in this paper that stands it apart from the standard New Keyne-
sian model is the heterogeneous cost channel expressed by the last three equations.
1See Appendix A for details.
2In particular, the impacts of loan rates on the economy from monetary policy are
squeezed by ￿1, ￿2, ￿R, and ￿S. Our aim is to investigate the e⁄ects of this hetero-

















































where ￿R and ￿S are the external ￿nance ratios in loan R and loan S in production,
respectively, " de￿nes the labor-type di⁄erence, ￿ is related to a price stickiness, and
￿ is the discount factor. When a ￿rm ￿nance all production costs by external loans,
￿R and ￿S are ones. Note that the ratio of ￿R and ￿S expresses the market share of
the two types of loans as half of the ￿rms￿business units are ￿nanced by loan type
R or S. Moreover, any di⁄erence in ￿R and ￿S infers a heterogeneous cost channel
e⁄ect on the economy.2 As the external ￿nance ratios increases, the cost channel
e⁄ect captured by ￿R, ￿S, ￿1, or ￿2 monotonically increases.
3 Approximated welfare function





















where UTt is the one-period utility, U(Ct;mt) is a strictly increasing and concave
function of consumption Ct and real money holding mt, where the two elements are
separable, and V (lt(h)) is an increasing and convex function of labor supply lt(h).
2As extensions, we can assume di⁄erent " and introduce heterogeneous stickiness for di⁄erent
loans, as in Sudo and Teranishi (2008), to make the heterogeneous cost channel. However, the
implications for monetary policy do not change.
3See Appendix B for a detailed derivation.
3Under the monetary transaction cost, we have a second-order approximated loss












￿1 b RR;t ￿ ￿2 b RS;t
￿2￿
;
where ￿, ￿x, x￿, ￿￿, ￿i, i￿, and ￿RS are positive parameters. Note that the welfare
loss is evaluated in terms of the deviation from the steady state where the price is
￿ exible and the loan rates are constant.
4 Optimal monetary policy rule
The central bank minimizes the discounted sum of the future loss subject to the four
constraints, (1), (2), (3), and (4).
4.1 Optimal discretionary policy
Under a discretionary policy following Woodford (2003), the optimal monetary policy
rule is given by:4
b it = i
￿ + ￿x(xt ￿ x
￿) + ￿￿￿t + ￿R
￿















(￿1￿R ￿ ￿2￿S) 7 0:
We emphasize three points. First, the optimal discretionary rule holds the term
of the credit spread. This simply means that the STR is the optimal monetary
4For regular parameters, as in Woodford (2003), the following rule satis￿es determinacy given
equations (1), (2), (3), and (4).
4policy in a model including explicitly heterogeneous bank loans. When there is no
loan contract, the STR is reduced to the regular TR as:
b it = i
￿ + ￿x(xt ￿ x
￿) + ￿￿￿t:
Second, rather than a pure credit spread, the credit spread that can be adjusted
by the e⁄ects to the economy as
￿
￿1 b RR;t ￿ ￿2 b RS;t
￿
is the central bank￿ s policy
purpose. Thus, the central bank more sensitively changes the policy rate to the loan
rate that has a larger e⁄ect on the economy.
Third, the sign of ￿R depends on the sign of (￿1￿R ￿ ￿2￿S). Thus, the optimal
monetary policy response to the positive credit spread of
￿
￿1 b RR;t ￿ ￿2 b RS;t
￿
can
be negative or positive by the parameters.5 If ￿1￿R > ￿2￿S (￿1￿R < ￿2￿S), the
last term in the rule of equation (5) demands a negative (positive) response to the
credit spread.67 Because ￿1￿R (￿2￿S) monotonically increases as ￿R (￿S) increases,
the optimal monetary policy response to the credit spread depends on the ￿nancial
market structure, i.e., cost channel structure.
In the context of the spread from the policy rate to the market rate, the same
argument holds. Now we assume uR;t > 0 and uS;t = 0, so the loan rate of type S is
a proxy for the policy (safe) rate and the loan rate of type R is a proxy for the risky
rate. The optimal response of the policy rate to the spread on the risky rate from
the policy rate is ambiguous according to the cost channel structure.
4.2 Optimal commitment policy
Under the timeless perspective commitment policy in Woodford (2003), the optimal
monetary policy rule is given as:
(1 ￿ ￿1L)(1 ￿ ￿2L)(b it ￿ i
￿) = (1 ￿ ￿1L)(1 ￿ ￿2L)￿R
￿
￿1 b RL;t ￿ ￿2 b RS;t
￿2
+ ft;
5The reason for ambiguity of ￿￿ is that the policy rate increases in￿ ation due to external ￿nance








7Eventually, the central bank changes the policy rate to adjust the more elastic loan rate to the
policy rate, as captured by ￿R or ￿S, towards the less elastic loan rate to narrow the credit spread.
5where















and ￿1 + ￿2 = 1 + ￿
￿1 + ￿￿￿
￿1, ￿1￿2 = ￿
￿1, ￿3 = ￿ ￿ ￿￿1 (￿1￿R + ￿2￿S), and
￿4 = ￿￿1￿
￿1 (￿1￿R + ￿2￿S).
We can see the same properties in the credit spread term, although the rule is
more complicated.
5 Discussion
In some developed countries, such as Japan, the U.S., and the euro area, and other
European countries, we can see that their central banks have hit the zero lower bound
on nominal interest rates because of the U.S. subprime mortgage crisis from fall 2007.
However, their aim is still to reduce the credit spread between the policy rate and
other (risky) market rates.
As shown in the preceding section, the central bank should narrow the credit
spread between the policy (safe) rate and risky rate. In this section, we investigate
the e⁄ect of the zero lower bound constraint on the optimal monetary policy for the
credit spread. Note that we assume the situation where the central bank lowers the
policy rate to reduce the credit spread on the risky rate from the policy rate.
Under a ￿ exible loan rate, both the discretionary and commitment policies can
no longer decrease the credit spread when the policy rate hits the zero lower bound
constraint. However, when we introduce the sticky loan rate setting, where the loan
rate can not perfectly adjust in every period, to the risky loan rate curve given by
equation (3), the two monetary policies make di⁄erent implications. Borrowing from
Sudo and Teranishi (2008), the risky loan rate curve under a sticky loan rate setting
is given by:
b RR;t = ￿
R
1 Et b RR;t+1 + ￿
R







2 , and ￿
R
3 are positive parameters. In this case, the commitment policy,
i.e., the future promise on the low policy rate path, can reduce the risky loan rate,
implying a narrowing of the credit spread between the policy rate b it and the risky
rate b RR;t. This holds even under the zero lower bound constraint since the sticky
loan rate curves include future expectation Et b RR;t+1.8
This implies that a commitment monetary policy is e⁄ective in reducing the
current credit spread when the central banks have exhausted scope for cutting the
policy rate particularly in the case where the loan rate is not perfectly ￿ exible. We,
however, note that just reducing the current credit spread to zero is not optimal
response for the central banks since the future promise on the low policy rate makes
a negative e⁄ect on the future credit spread at the sametime.
6 Concluding remarks
We theoretically show that the STR is the optimal monetary policy rule. This
supports Taylor￿ s suggestion that the FRB has reacted negatively to the credit spread
during the last few years. However, we show that the optimal monetary policy
response to the credit spread shock is ambiguous given the ￿nancial market structure.
A commitment monetary policy is e⁄ective in reducing the credit spread when the
central bank hits the zero lower bound constraint of the policy rate.
8See Appendix B for the approximated loss function under this setting.
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8Appendix (not for publication)
A Derivation of the model
Following Sudo and Teranishi (2008), we introduce heterogeneous nominal loan in-
terest rate contracts between private banks and ￿rms into a standard New Keynesian
framework model based on Woodford (2003). The model consists of four agents: a
representative consumer, ￿rms, a central bank, and private banks.
A.1 Cost minimization
In this model, we have two cost minimization problems. The ￿rst determines the
optimal allocation of di⁄erentiated goods for the consumer. The second determines
the optimal allocation of labor services, given the loan rates and wages for the ￿rm￿ s
president.
For the consumer, we assume that the consumer￿ s utility from consumption is
increasing and concave in the consumption index, which is de￿ned as a Dixit-Stiglitz
aggregator as in Dixit and Stiglitz (1977)9, of bundles of di⁄erentiated goods f 2 [0;1]










where Ct is aggregate consumption, ct(f) is a particular di⁄erentiated good along
a continuum produced by the ￿rm￿ s project group f, and ￿ > 1 is the elasticity
of substitution across goods produced by the project groups. For the consumption









9Dixit, A. and J. Stiglitz. ￿Monopolistic Competition and Optimum Product Diversity.￿Amer-
ican Economic Review, Vol. 67, 1977, pp. 297￿ 308.
1where Pt is the aggregate price and pt(f) is the price of a particular di⁄erentiated
good ct(f). As in other applications of the Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator, the consumer￿ s
allocation across di⁄erentiated goods in each time period must solve a cost mini-
mization problem. This means that the relative expenditures on a particular good







An advantage of this consumption distribution rule is to imply that the consumer￿ s
total expenditure on consumption goods is given by PtCt. We use this demand
function for di⁄erentiated goods in the ￿rm sector.
Firms optimally hire di⁄erentiated labor as price takers. This optimal labor
allocation is carried out through a two-step cost minimization problems. Firm f
hires all types of labor. Here, each ￿rm has to use two types of loan, loans R and
loans S. To replicate this situation, we assume that to ￿nance a labor cost for labor
type h 2 [0;n); the ￿rm has to use loan R, and to ￿nance the cost for labor type
h 2 [n;1]; it has to use loan S. We can think of this setting as a ￿rm uses loan
R for some project characterized by labor type h, but uses loan S for some project
characterized by labor type h. When hiring a labor from h 2 [0;n), a portion of
the labor cost associated with labor type h; which we denote as ￿R; is ￿nanced by
borrowing from the bank h. Then, the ￿rst-step cost minimization problem for the
























where rt(h) is the loan R interest rate applied to the employment of a particular labor
type h, lt(h;f) is the di⁄erentiated labor input with respect to h that is supplied
to ￿rm f, and ￿R is a preference parameter on di⁄erentiated labor. The bank h
2that provides loan R has some monopoly power over setting the loan interest rate.
Thus, we assume monopolistic competition in the loan market where the transactions





































wt (h)lt (h;f)dh = ￿tLt (f):
Through a similar cost minimization problem, we can derive the relative demand


















































is the loan S interest rate, ￿S is a portion of the labor cost ￿nanced by
bank h, and ￿S is a preference parameter for di⁄erentiated labors. In this model, we



















dh = ￿tLt (f):
According to the above optimality conditions, ￿rms optimally choose the alloca-
tion of di⁄erentiated workers between the two groups. Because ￿rms have a produc-
tion function that hires n workers from h 2 [0;n) and (1 ￿ n) workers from h 2 [n;1],
the second-step cost minimization problem describing the allocation of di⁄erentiated
labor between these groups is given by:
min
Lt;Lt
￿tLt (f) + ￿tLt (f);
3subject to the labor index:





nn (1 ￿ n)
1￿n : (11)
Then, the relative demand functions for each di⁄erentiated type of labor are derived
as follows:


















Therefore, we can obtain the following equations:
￿tLt (f) + ￿tLt (f) = e ￿te Lt (f);
lt (h;f) =
(￿






























from equations (7), (9), (12), and (13). We can now clearly see that the demand for
each di⁄erentiated worker depends on wages and loan interest rates, given the total
demand for labor.
Finally, from the assumption that the ￿rms ￿nance part of the labor costs by
loans, we can derive:

















































4These conditions demonstrate that the demands for each di⁄erentiated loan also
depend on the wages and loan interest rates, given the total labor demand.






We consider a representative consumer who derives utility from consumption and


















where Et is an expectation conditional on the state of nature at date t. The function
U is increasing and concave in the consumption index, as shown in the preceding
subsection, and real money holding. The budget constraint of the consumer is given
by:












where Bt is a risky asset, Dt is the amount of bank deposits, it is the nominal
deposit rate set by the central bank from t to t + 1, wt(h) is the nominal wage for










nominal dividend from the ownership of ￿rms, and Xt;t+1 is the stochastic discount
factor. We assume a complete ￿nancial market for risky assets. Thus, we can hold
a unique discount factor and can characterize the relationship between the deposit
rate and the stochastic discount factor:
51
1 + it
= Et [Xt;t+1]: (15)
Given the optimal allocation of consumption expenditure across the di⁄erentiated
goods, the consumer must choose the total amount of consumption, the optimal
amount of risky assets to hold, and an optimal amount to deposit in each period.
The necessary and su¢ cient conditions are given by:















Together with equation (15), we ￿nd that the condition given by equation (16) ex-
presses the intertemporal optimal allocation on aggregate consumption. Assuming
that the market clears such that the supply of each di⁄erentiated good equals its
demand, ct(f) = yt(f) and Ct = Yt, we ￿nally obtain the standard New Keynesian
IS curve by log-linearizing equation (16):
xt = Etxt+1 ￿ ￿(b it ￿ Et￿t+1 ￿ b r
n
t );
where we call xt the output gap as de￿ned in the next section, ￿t+1 is in￿ ation, and
b rn
t is the natural rate of interest. b rn
t is an exogenous shock. Each variable is de￿ned
as the log deviation from its steady state where the price is ￿ exible and the loan
rates are constant (except xt and ￿t. Also, the log-linearized version of variable mt
is expressed by b mt = ln(mt=m), where m is the steady state value of mt.). We de￿ne
￿ ￿ ￿
UY
UY Y Y > 0.
In this model, the consumer provides di⁄erentiated types of labor to the ￿rm and
so holds the power to decide the wage of each type of labor as in Erceg, Henderson
and Levin (2000).10 We assume that each project group hires all types of workers in
the same proportion. The consumer sets each wage wt(h) for any h in every period
10Erceg, C., D. Henderson, and A. Levin. ￿Optimal Monetary Policy with Staggered Wage and
Price Contracts.￿Journal of Monetary Economics, Vol. 46, 2000, pp. 281￿ 313.
6to maximize its utility subject to the budget constraint given by equation (14) and



























In this paper, we assume that the consumer supplies its labor only to the ￿rm, not
the private bank. We use the relations given by equations (17) and (18) on the ￿rm
side.
A.3 Firms
There exists a continuum of ￿rms populated over unit mass [0;1]. Each ￿rm plays
two roles. First, each ￿rm decides the amount of di⁄erentiated labor to be employed
from both h 2 [0;n) and h 2 [n;1], through the two-step cost minimization problem
on production cost. Part of the costs of labor must be ￿nanced by external loans
from banks. For example, to ￿nance the costs of hiring workers from h 2 [0;n), the
￿rm must borrow from banks that provide loan R. However, to ￿nance the costs of
hiring workers from h 2 [n;1], the ￿rm must borrow from banks that provide loan
S. Here, we assume that ￿rms must use all types of labor and therefore borrow both
loan R and loan S in a ￿xed proportion.12 Second, in a monopolistically competitive
goods market, where individual demand curves on di⁄erentiated consumption goods
are o⁄ered by consumers, each ￿rm sets a di⁄erentiated goods price to maximize
pro￿t. Prices are set in a staggered manner, as in a Calvo (1983)13 - Yun (1992)14
11We assume a ￿ exible wage setting in the sense that the consumer can change the wage in every
period.
12The same structure is assumed for employment in Woodford (2003).
13Calvo, G. ￿Staggered Prices in a Utility Maximizing Framework.￿Journal of Monetary Eco-
nomics, Vol. 12, 1983, pp. 383-398.
14Yun, T. ￿Nominal Price Rigidity, Money Supply Endogeneity, and Business Cycles.￿Journal
of Monetary Economics, Vol. 37, 1996, pp. 345-370.
7framework.
As standard in New Keynesian models following the Calvo (1983) - Yun (1992)
framework, each ￿rm f resets its price with probability (1 ￿ ￿) and maximizes the







pt (f)ct;T (f) ￿ e ￿T e LT (f)
i
; (19)
where we assume the production function as yt(f) = F(e LT (f)). The production
function is increasing and concave. Here, the ￿rm sets pt (f) under the Calvo (1983)
- Yun (1992) framework. The present discounted value of the pro￿t given by equation












CT ￿ e ￿T e LT (f)
)
:
We note that price setting is independent of the loan interest rate setting of private
banks.
The optimal price setting of pt (f) in the situation where managers can reset their
















where we substitute equation (6). By further substituting equations (17) and (18)














































































8By log-linearizing equation (21), we derive:
1
1 ￿ ￿￿










1 b RR;T + ￿
￿







2 ￿ (1 ￿ n)
￿S(1+RS)
1+￿SRS are positive parameters, and we
de￿ne the real marginal cost as:
c mct;T (f) ￿
Z n
0























































Then, equation (22) can be transformed into:
1
1 ￿ ￿￿









c mcT + ￿
￿











where we make use of the relationship:
c mct;T (f) = c mcT ￿ !p￿
"






where !p is the elasticity of
@e Lt;T(f)
@yt;T(f) with respect to y. We further denote the average



































The point is that the unit marginal cost is the same for all ￿rms in the situation
where each ￿rm uses all types of labor and loans in the same proportion. Thus, all
￿rms set the same price if they have the opportunity to reset their prices at time t.
In the Calvo (1983) - Yun (1992) setting, the evolution of the aggregate price

































The current aggregate price is given by the weighted average of the changed and
unchanged prices. Because the chances of resetting prices are randomly assigned
to each ￿rm with equal probability, an aggregate price change at time t should be
evaluated by the average price change for all ￿rms. By log-linearizing equation (26),
together with equation (25), we derive the following New Keynesian Phillips curve:
￿t = ￿
￿
c mct + ￿
￿





where the slope coe¢ cient ￿ ￿
(1￿￿)(1￿￿￿)
￿(1+!p￿) is a positive parameter. This is quite
similar to the standard New Keynesian Phillips curve, though it contains loan interest
rates as cost components.
Here, according to the discussion in Woodford (2003), we de￿ne the natural rate
of output Y n





































































where, under the natural rate of output, we assume a ￿ exible price setting, p￿
t(f) =
Pt, and assume no impact of monetary policy, rt(h) = rt(h) = R, and so hold
yt(f) = Y n
t . ln
t (h), ln
t (h), e Ln
t (f), and e Ln
t (f) are the amount of labor under Y n
t ,
respectively. Then, we have:
c mct = (! + ￿
￿1)(b Yt ￿ b Y
n
t );
where b Yt ￿ ln(Yt=Y ), and b Y n
t ￿ ln(Y n
t =Y ), and ! is the sum of the elasticity of the
marginal disutility of work with respect to the output increase and the elasticity of
1
F0(F￿1(y)) with respect to output increase.15 By de￿ning xt ￿ b Yt ￿ b Y n
t , we ￿nally
have:









= ￿xt + ￿1 b RR;t + ￿2 b RS;t + ￿Et￿t+1;
where ￿ ￿ ￿(! + ￿￿1), ￿1 = ￿￿￿
1, and ￿2 = ￿￿￿
2.
A.4 Private banks
There exists a continuum of private banks populated over [0;1]. There are two types
of banks: banks that provide loans R populated over [0;n) and banks that provide
loans S populated over [n;1]. In this model, unlike Sudo and Teranishi (2008), this
15! ￿ !p + !w, where !w is the elasticity of the marginal disutility of work with respect to the
output increase in
Vl(lt(h);￿t)
UY (Yt;￿t) . Woodford (Ch. 3, 2003) provides a more detailed derivation.
11heterogeneity is not explained by the heterogeneous stickiness of the loan interest
rate. Thus, we assume that the distinction between loans R and loans S lies in the
di⁄erence in the monopolistic power of private banks. This varies according to the
ratios of external ￿nance as it induces di⁄erent markup distortion.16 Each private
bank plays two roles: (1) to collect deposits from consumers; and (2) under the
monopolistically competitive loan market, to set di⁄erentiated nominal loan interest
rates according to their individual loan demand curves, given the amount of deposits.
We assume that each bank sets the di⁄erentiated nominal loan interest rate according
to the types of labor force.
A bank that provides loan R only lends to ￿rms when they hire labor from
h 2 [0;n). However, a bank that provides loan S only lends to ￿rms when they hire
labor from h 2 [n;1]. First, we describe the optimization problem of a bank that
provides loan R. Under the segmented environment stemming from the di⁄erences
in labor supply, private banks can set di⁄erent loan interest rates depending on the
types of labor. Consequently, the private bank holds some monopoly power over the
loan interest rate to ￿rms. Therefore, the bank h chooses the loan interest rate rt (h)
that maximizes pro￿t:
qt;T (h;f)f[1 + rt (h)] ￿ (1 + iT)g:







R f[1 + rt (h)] ￿ (1 + iT)g
￿
= 0: (27)
By log-linearizing equations (27), we can determine the relationship between the loan
and deposit interest rate as follows:
b RR;t = ￿Rb it;
where ￿R ￿ ￿
￿￿1
1+i
1+RR is a positive parameter.17 This equation describes the loan
interest rate (supply) curve by the banks that provide loans R.












= 0 in relationship between RR and i.
12Similarly, from the optimization problem of bank h that provide loan S, we can
obtain the relationship between the loan and deposit interest rates as follows:
b RS;t = ￿Sb it;
where ￿S ￿ ￿
￿￿1
1+i
1+RS is a positive parameter.

























dh = (1 ￿ n)DT:
B Derivation of the loss function
B.1 Under a ￿ exible loan rate
In derivation of approximated welfare function, we basically follow the way of Wood-
ford (2003). Note that the welfare approximation is calculated in terms of the devia-
tion from the steady state where the price is ￿ exible and the loan rates are constant.
Under the situation where the supply of goods matches the demand for goods at




























13We log-linearize equation (28) step by step to derive an approximated welfare func-
tion. Firstly, we log-linearize the ￿rst term of equation (28). In this log-linearization,
we follow the derivation in Woodford (Ch. 6 and Appendix E, 2003).
U(Yt;mt;￿t) = Y Uc
2
4
b Yt + 1
2(1 ￿ ￿￿1)b Y 2
t + ￿￿1gtb Yt + sm￿yb Yt
￿sm￿ib it + 1
2￿￿yb Y 2
t + ￿￿m
t b Yt ￿ 1
2￿￿1￿i(b it)2
3





b Yt + 1
2(1 ￿ ￿￿1)b Y 2




t b Yt ￿ 1
2￿￿1￿i(b it ￿ i￿)2
3
5 + t:i:p + Order(k ￿ k
3);
(29)
where U ￿ U(Y ;0), ￿t is an exogenous shock, t:i:p is the term that is independent of
monetary policy, Order(k ￿ k3) expresses order terms higher than the second-order
approximation, ￿￿1 ￿ ￿Y Ucc
Uc > 0, gt ￿ ￿Uc￿￿t
Y Ucc , sm ￿ mum
cuc > 0, ￿y ￿ ￿ Y ucm
mumm > 0,
￿i ￿ ￿ uc
mumm > 0, ￿ ￿ mucm







um ￿t ￿ ￿￿1gt
i
, ￿ ￿ Y
m,
i￿ = ln i￿i
m
1+i , i is the steady state value of the policy interest rate, and i
m is the
steady state value of the interest rate on the real money holding. Here, we assume
the interest rate on the real money is constant.















2 + Vl￿L￿tEhb lt(h)







(1 + ￿)b L
2








+t:i:p + Order( k ￿ k
3); (30)
where e ￿t ￿ ￿
Vl￿￿t
LVll , ￿ ￿
LVll
Vl , ￿h ￿ Y
LfL, !p ￿
ffLL
(fL)2, qt ￿ (1 + !￿1)at + !￿1￿e ￿t,
at ￿ lnAt, varhb lt(h) is the variance of b lt(h) across all types of labor, and varfb pt(f)
is the variance of b pt(f) across all di⁄erentiated good prices. Here the de￿nition of














14and so we have b Lt = Ehb lt(h) + 1
2
￿￿1
￿ varhb lt(h) + Order(k ￿ k3) in the second order
approximation. We use this relation in the second line.















2 + Vl￿L￿tEhb lt(h)







(1 + ￿)b L
2









+t:i:p + Order( k ￿ k
3): (31)
















and so we have b Lt = Ehb lt(h) + 1
2
￿￿1
￿ varhb lt(h) + Order(k ￿ k3) in the second order
approximation. We use this relation in the second line.










nb Lt + n
2(1 + ￿)b L2
t ￿ n￿e ￿tb Lt + n
2(￿ + 1
￿)varhb lt(h)
+(1 ￿ n)b Lt + 1￿n
2 (1 + ￿)b L
2
t ￿ (1 ￿ n)￿e ￿t
b Lt + 1￿n













t ￿ ￿e ￿t￿
￿1
h
b e Lt + n(1 ￿ n)1+￿
2
￿




￿)varhb lt(h) + 1￿n




+t:i:p + Order( k ￿ k
3); (32)
where we use:
b e Lt = n b Lt + (1 ￿ n)b Lt;
from equation (11). Then, we employ the condition that the demand for labor is












15where the production function is given by yt(f) = Atf(Lt(f)), where f(￿) is an
increasing and concave function. By taking the second order approximation, we
have:







(1+!p￿)￿varfb pt(f)+Order(k ￿ k
3);
where we log-linearize the demand function for di⁄erentiated goods to derive the
relation varf lnyt(f) = ￿
2varf lnpt(f), which can be derived from the consumer￿ s












. Also, we use
the relation of ￿h￿ = !w and ! = !p + !w, where !w is the elasticity of the real
wage under a ￿ exible-wage labor supply with respect to aggregate output. We can












b Yt + 1
2(1 + !)b Y 2
t ￿ !qtb Yt + n(1 ￿ n)1+￿
2
￿
b Lt ￿ b Lt
￿2
+1
2(1 + !p￿)￿varf lnpt(f) + n
2￿
￿1
















b Yt + 1
2(1 + !)b Y 2







￿b RR;t ￿ ￿￿ b RS;t
￿2
+ 1




h (￿ + 1
￿)varh lnlt(h) + 1￿n
2 ￿
￿1





+t:i:p + Order( k ￿ k
3):
From the second line to the third line, we use following transformations:
b Lt ￿ b Lt = b ￿t ￿ b ￿t
=
￿


























1+￿RRR and ￿￿ ￿
￿S(1+RS)
1+￿SRS . There we use log-linear relations from
equation (12), equation (13), equation (17), and equation (18) and the de￿nitions
from equation (7), equation (8), equation (9), equation (10), equation (23), and
equation (24).












(1 ￿ ￿)b Yt + 1
2(1 + !)b Y 2
t ￿ !qtb Yt + 1




h (￿ + 1
￿)varh lnlt(h) + 1￿n
2 ￿
￿1














+t:i:p + Order( k ￿ k
3); (33)


















































where a ￿ exible price and no role of monetary policy is of order one, as in Woodford
(2003).18 Thus, in terms of the natural rate of output, we actually assume that the
real marginal cost function of ￿rm Z(￿) in order to supply a good f is given by:


























































then the natural rate of output Y n



















(1 ￿ ￿) (35)
18We assume that monetary policy has no impact on the level of the natural rate of output.
17where the parameter ￿ is of order one and expresses the distortion of the output
level.19 Then, we can combine equations (29) and (33):
UTt ’ Y Uc
2




￿ b Yt + (￿￿1gt + !qt + ￿￿m




2￿￿varf lnpt(f) ￿ n








￿b RR;t ￿ ￿￿ b RS;t
￿2
￿1
2￿￿1￿i(b it ￿ i￿)2
3
7 7 7 7 7 7
5










￿mc(xt ￿ x￿)2 + ￿￿varf lnpt(f)







￿b RR;t ￿ ￿￿ b RS;t
￿2





+t:i:p + Order( k ￿ k
3);
where ￿mc ￿ ￿￿1 + ! ￿ ￿￿y, ￿￿ ￿ ￿(1 + !p￿), ￿l ￿ ￿
￿1
h (￿ + ￿￿1), ￿s ￿ ￿
￿1
h (￿ + ￿￿1),
xt ￿ b Yt￿b Y n
t , and x￿ ￿ ln(Y ￿=Y ). Here Y ￿
t is a solution in equation (35) when ￿ = 0,
called the e¢ cient level of output as de￿ned in Woodford (2003). In the second line,














t ) = ￿(￿
￿1 + !)￿ + Order(k ￿ k
2);
which is given by the relation between the e¢ cient level of output and the natural
rate of output in terms of one by equation (34). Note that the same is true for x￿
when ￿ is positive and Order(k ￿ k). This expresses that the percentage di⁄erence

















we can induce ￿ = 0 as in Rotemberg and Woodford (1997).
18between Y n
t and Y ￿
t is independent from shocks in the ￿rst-order approximation.
Here, we have:
varh lnlt(h) = 0;
varh lnlt(h) = 0;















￿b RR;t ￿ ￿￿ b RS;t
￿2




+t:i:p + Order( k ￿ k
3): (36)
The remaining work needed to derive the approximated welfare function is to
evaluate varh lnpt(f) and varh ln(1 + rt(h)) in equation (36). Following Woodford
(2003), we de￿ne:
P t ￿ Ef lnpt(f);
4t ￿ varf lnpt(f):
Then, we can make the following relations:
P t ￿ P t￿1 = Ef
￿




lnpt￿1(f) ￿ P t￿1
￿




t(f) ￿ P t￿1
￿




t(f) ￿ P t￿1
￿
; (37)
and we also have:
194t = varf
￿




lnpt(f) ￿ P t￿1
￿2o




lnpt￿1(f) ￿ P t￿1
￿2o




t(f) ￿ P t￿1
￿2o
￿ (P t ￿ P t￿1)
2




t(f) ￿ P t￿1
￿2o
￿ (P t ￿ P t￿1)
2
= ￿4t￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿)(varf(lnp
￿






t(f) ￿ P t￿1
￿￿2





(P t ￿ P t￿1); (38)
where we use equation (37) and p￿
t(f) is the optimal price setting by the agent f
following the Calvo (1983) - Yun (1992) framework. We note that all project groups
re-set the same price at time t when they are selected to change prices, because the
unit marginal cost of production is the same for all project groups. In addition, we
have the following relation that relates P t with Pt:
P t = lnPt + Order(k ￿ k
2);
where Order(k ￿ k2) is in order terms higher than the ￿rst-order approximation.






Equation (38) can then be transformed as:




where ￿t ￿ ln Pt


























t + t:i:p + Order(k ￿ k
3):





















where ￿ ￿ 1
2Y uc, ￿￿ ￿ ￿
(1￿￿)(1￿￿￿)￿(1 + !p￿), ￿x ￿ (￿￿1 + !), ￿
￿
RS ￿ n(1 ￿ n) 1
(1+￿),













t + ￿x(xt ￿ x￿)2 + ￿i(b it ￿ i￿)2
+￿RS
￿




where ￿RS = 1
(1+￿)￿2.
B.2 Under a sticky loan rate
When one of the loan rate curves, in particular the risky rate curve, is determined












t + ￿x(xt ￿ x￿)2 + ￿i(b it ￿ i￿)2
+￿R(b RR;t ￿ b RR;t￿1)2 + ￿RS
￿













(1￿’R)(1￿’R￿). ’R de￿nes the probability of re-setting
the loan rate, implying a sticky loan rate, following Calvo (1983) - Yun (1996).
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